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Western Historical Quarterly Oregon. Truth had no rights that assertion was bound to respect?if the assertion served American empire-building.
Americans' phenomenal and unparalleled success in acquiring large pieces of North America, and what is more, occupying them and settling them with young, lusty, nubile, and fertile frontier folk, inculcated in us Americans a habit of empire-building that is with us still, around the world and in Iraq.1 We gave up some decades ago the actual acquisition of new real estate, but we vigorously assert the habit of exercising North America any more, but the globe. Such is the habit of empire, and it has been going on since the earliest days of the Republic. We fortuitously gained title to Trans Appalachia, then Louisiana, then Texas, Oregon, and the Southwest, all within the first seventy years of our independent national existence?during which time, not incidentally, the nation's population exploded sixfold from under four million to almost twenty-five million. Acquisition would probably not have lasted but for the occupation that followed; possessions that were not populated by their conquerors usually became independent, as did most of the French, British, Portuguese, and other empires' outposts of a hundred years ago.2 In the United States, however, from Trans-Appalachia to the Pacific, demography either followed diplomacy and conquest, or accompanied it as in Texas, and ratified it, so far permanently.
Several years ago I taught seminars on the U. S. territorial acquisitions and began a book on them, soon to be finished. It ties together the acquisitions with the demographic occupation, better known to us here under the old W.H.A. rubric of "the westward movement." The book has expanded into a broader history of American imperialism since 1782. There have been three phases. The first was the acquiring of the continental landmass from Atlantic to Pacific, including unsuccessful raids on Canada and a highly successful one on Mexico. A second then followed: the offshore acquisitions including Alaska, Hawai'i, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the protectorates around the Caribbean and Pacific. Finally, a third has taken shape, the "virtual" (non territorial but real) empire of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, the more than seven-hundred military and naval bases the U. S. maintains around the world, including the new embassy, the world's largest, that the U. S. is building in Baghdad.
Only the first phase involved settlement in a truly major way. But all are of a piece, a continuous record of empire-building. And it was the West, as we have traditionally thought of it and studied it, where Americans learned the imperialist habit, because it was so successful, so quick, and frankly (despite the constant conflicts with neighbors and with Native peoples), so easy. Those other peoples were overwhelmed by disease, by technology, by money, by resources, by ideology, by warfare, but also and definitively by the hugely high American rate of natural increase. Americans out-procreated ev erybody?not only the Native Americans, but also the French and the Spanish, who claimed vast American empires but were never able to fill them with their own people.
Americans did, and displaced them.
Besides demography, imperialism has also been a habit easily learned and contin ued because of a particular ideology. It has rested on a persistent set of beliefs, most fundamentally the exceptionalist conviction: that this nation has been divinely or providentially favored and stands for a morally good polity, worthy of export; that its and with whom. Bush's born-again faith has been restated many times and the "reli gious right" has been a key part of his base. Both exhibit a powerful sense of mission: that they were sent by Providence or the Deity to spread liberty or freedom. For Polk, "liberty" did not include slaves, Indians, or Mexicans, and for Bush, "freedom" has not extended to Abu Ghraib, Guant?namo, or suspected terrorists swept up for CIA rendition. The end, whether called "liberty" or "freedom," justified the means. In both cases, whether "liberty" or "freedom," the underlying idea was that our nation and our society possessed both?exceptionally?and that it was the leader's job to bestow it on the less fortunate.
Polk and Bush also shared, as presidents, the broadest assertion of executive power that their historical contexts permitted. were in foreign policy, and if Bush is ultimately deemed to have had achievements, they will likely be in that area. So let us look more closely at the two major activities of these hedgehogs: Polk in Mexico and Bush in Iraq.
As stated above, the outstanding similarity of the two presidencies is their foreign wars and the fact that the reasons Polk and Bush gave for their wars were either false from the start, or turned out to be false. for the purpose of erecting a platform from which to assail the President of the United States, and through him the Democratic party" p. 13. Denying any change in war aims Douglas said, "I do not understand that it is, or at any time has been, a war of conquest.... It is a war of self-de fence [sic], forced upon us by our enemy, and prosecuted on our part in vindication of our honor, and the integrity of our territory. The enemy invaded our territory, and we repelled the invasion, and demanded satisfaction for all our grievances. In order to compel Mexico to do us justice, it was necessary to follow her retreating armies into her territory, to take possession of State after State, and hold them until she would yield to our reasonable demands; and inasmuch as.. .she was unable to make indemnity in money, we must necessarily take it in land. Conquest was not the motive for the prosecution of the war; satisfaction, indemnity, security, was the motive -con quest and territory the means," p. 5. Al Qaida. The motivator was a much broader policy position, indeed an ideology, which was set forth in "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" issued 
